The medical division of the International Committee of the Red Cross undertook an expanded programme of immunization in rural areas of Mozambique controlled by the resistance. This programme was evaluated by a 30 cluster survey which showed that 82 per cent of children between 1 and 5 years and 81.7 per cent of mothers of children of less than 1 year had had contact with the vaccination service. Full vaccination was achieved in 40.6 and 35.2 per cent respectively. The reasons for immunization failure were established. The study shows that vaccination of the civilian population of a developing country at war is possible and, importantly, the outcome of the programme can be assessed.
Introduction
Medical aid to developing countries at war is popularly conceived as adequate as long as medical materials and personnel are sent. The effect of such aid is often a secondary consideration. However, there is now an increased awareness among professionals working in this field that the effect of such medical aid is unknown and may even be ineffective.' 12 At the same time the bodies that provide the finances increasingly demand, but rarely receive, an objective evaluation of the work they sponsor. Accountability is also demanded by the medical profession. 3 The collection of reliable data is difficult and may even be dangerous for the survey team. The logistics involved in applying accepted statistical methods are time consuming and expensive. Nevertheless, the medical division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has decided that its field actions must be evaluated. This is the only means to avoid repetition of mistakes in the future.
A common form of medical aid to the developing world is vaccination of the civilian population. The impact of a vaccination programme in a country at war has never been evaluated with data.
Mozambique has suffered 16 years of civil war. It is now the poorest country in the world. 4 In 1992 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF undertook a preventive health care programme in areas which had not been reached for many years by the government health services because of the war.
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The programme included vitamin A supplementation, deworming, and health education including basic hygiene and AIDS. It also undertook an expanded programme of immunization (EPI) against the six EPI diseases of measles, poliomyelitis (oral poliomyelitis vaccine, OPV) diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus (diphtheria/ tetanus/pertussis vaccine, DTP) and tuberculosis (BCG vaccine) in children of less than 5 years of age as well as immunizing women of childbearing age against tetanus. 5 From 1992 to 1994, a total of 255 890 vaccinations were administered, each person receiving a vaccination card. The programme covered 25 different locations in 12 districts in the provinces of Sofala, Manica, and Nampula, reaching an estimated 276500 people. Most areas were not accessible by road because of the problem of landmines. 6 All material and personnel had to be flown in by small aeroplanes requiring approximately 250 flying hours per year. The total cost was US$2.84 per vaccine given. The study reports the evaluation of this programme.
Our programme provided 81 per cent of all vaccines in the programme area zone. Other sources of vaccine included Terre des Hommes, M6decins sans Frontieres, CUAMM (Collegio Universitario Aspiranti Medici Missionari), the Ministry of Health, the Mozambican Red Cross, and the Malawian and Zimbabwean health systems.
Methods
We did a 30 cluster EPI vaccination survey 7 over one month in September 1994. For the analysis we used the COSAS 4 program for EPI 30 cluster coverage surveys. The areas surveyed included all the areas in the programme.
The survey methodology required some adjustments imposed by the field conditions. Where the location to be surveyed was too large and more than one cluster was required from that location as determined by the protocol, the starting point of each cluster was determined by choosing an administrative subdivision of the location at random and starting the cluster there instead of starting the cluster at the centre of that location. This ensured that each individual within the location had the same chance of being included in the sample and eliminated the bias that might have been introduced by surveying near to a vaccination point, which was usually in the centre.
At each house included in the survey, all children and women of childbearing age were asked if they possessed a vaccination card. In the absence of a card, a reliable vaccination history was accepted. Children between 1 and 5 years old were included. Because the date of birth is frequently not documented, children were deemed to be one year old if they were able to walk and five years old if more than 110 cm tall. A child was considered fully immunized if it had received all eight antigens (1 BCG, 3 DTP, 3 OPV, 1 measles) at the required intervals. The relative in charge of any incompletely vaccinated child was questioned as to why the child had not been brought for vaccination using the standard World Health Organization questionnaire. 7 With respect to maternal vaccination against neonatal tetanus, women were only included if they had a child less than 1 year of age. The child was considered immunized if the mother had received the second of two doses of tetanus toxoid at least 15 days prior to delivery. Transport was by means of small aeroplanes as major access roads were not yet cleared of landmines.The survey team then continued by motorbike, or in some areas on foot.
Results
To find 212 children estimated at between 1 and 5 years old, 400 houses were visited, and to find 213 mothers of children estimated as less than 1 year old, 583 houses were visited.
Of the 212 children, 174 (82.1 per cent) had had contact with the vaccination services. Vaccination cards were produced by 146 (68.9 per cent) confirming one or more previous contacts. Complete vaccination was given to 86 (40.6 per cent) and 88 (41.5 per cent) received between one and seven antigens. The reasons given for the 126 (59.1 per cent) not completing the full vaccination course are shown in Table 1 . The DTP dropout rate (the proportion of children receiving the first but not the subsequent two doses of DTP) was 45 per cent.
Of the 213 mothers, 174 (81.7 per cent) had received one or more doses of tetanus toxoid and 140 (65.7 per cent) produced vaccination cards. Two doses of tetanus 
Discussion
Vaccinating in war-torn countries is difficult, but it can be done. It requires careful planning and a strong logistics apparatus. In addition, access needs to be negotiated between the warring parties. Security considerations complicate every movement, and landmines may prevent access to certain areas or make the logistics more difficult. Evaluating the vaccination programme is even more difficult, but this also can be done. The absence of any health surveillance system further complicates the collection of data.
This study provides a baseline for comparison for any other agency undertaking vaccination programmes in similar circumstances. The results demonstrate that not only can vaccination programmes proceed in areas affected by war, but they can also be evaluated. We recommend strongly that vaccination programmes should not be planned without an evaluation component.
Within three years, the programme was able to achieve full vaccination coverage rates comparable to the country average, which is 46 per cent for DTP. 9 As the vaccination programmes continue, operated by other organizations in coordination with UNICEF, many women and children will have a chance to complete their vaccination.
The information on defaulters (Table 1) proved of value for formulating future vaccination strategies which will aim at providing vaccination services continuously at fixed health posts (29 per cent of the children missed the vaccination because their mother was travelling during the campaign days), and at providing outreach services from these fixed posts (13 per cent complained that the vaccination services were too far away).
Eighty-two per cent of the population has had at least one contact with the vaccination services. This is a high figure for an area affected by war. Several factors explain these results: in the beginning, vaccination campaigns were organized at the same time as the food distributions. On other occasions people were given clothing material. These are powerful incentives and indeed, people will walk several hours for this.
People also tend to act as a group: when part of a village decided to go, the undecided often followed this group. In an area cut off for many years, it is likely that curiosity also played a role. Many local administrators actively encouraged the population to attend. As their word is often law, some sites had almost complete coverage. Part of our strategy was based on convincing local administrators about the usefulness of vaccinating.
Now that the war has ended, all vaccination services will continue thanks to the involvement of non governmental organizations (NGOs), the Mozambican Red Cross and the Mozambican Ministry of Health. The involvement of NGOs in the health care system of Mozambique can only be an intermediary strategy, but makes the necessary link between the vaccination campaigns and a regular EPI programme, fully integrated into the Government's health system. The Ministry of Health at present may not have the resources, finance, or staff, to expand its services immediately into the areas previously controlled by the resistance and it is likely that NGOs will provide vaccination services from the health centres during the transition period.
Emergency programmes are often criticized because they fail to ensure the continuation of the programmes. ICRC was very much aware of this when negotiating with other organizations. Agreements have been reached for all areas and all programmes will continue. Therefore, the efforts made during the war will not be lost; on the contrary they will provide a basis for the health care system of the post-war period.
We can conclude that it is possible to implement a regular EPI programme in a war zone, provided that access is negotiated and the logistic apparatus is available. It is also possible to evaluate the programme, which in turn will help the planning of post-war development.
